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 Chapter 9 
 Risk Communication and the Role 
of the Public: Towards Inclusive 
Environmental Governance of the Baltic Sea? 
 Anna  Maria  Jönsson ,  Magnus  Boström ,  Marion  Dreyer , and  Sara  Söderström 
 Abstract  This chapter focuses on forms of and challenges for risk communication 
within regional environmental governance, based on an analysis of fi ve environ-
mental risks in the Baltic Sea – marine oil transportation, chemicals, overfi shing, 
eutrophication and alien species. We address questions about how risks are framed 
and communicated and also analyse the role of communication in the governance 
process. Our main focus is on risk communication with the public (e.g. existing 
institutional arrangements and procedures of risk communication), but we also 
relate this analysis to discussions on communication with a broad range of actors 
and issues of stakeholder participation and communication. In the study we have 
identifi ed some examples of relatively well-working risk communication with parts 
of the organised public in the Baltic Sea region (BSR), such as in fi sheries or eutro-
phication, but also a number of different barriers and obstacles. Our key result from 
this study is that BSR consists of many national institutions for risk communication, 
but that there are hardly any centralised institutions for risk communication activi-
ties relating to environmental governance in the region. Another key conclusion is 
that public risk communication in this array of cross-national environmental risks is 
restricted mainly to (one-way) information. Against this backdrop and from our 
 A. M.  Jönsson (*) 
 School of Culture and Education ,  Södertörn University ,  14189  Huddinge ,  Sweden 
 e-mail: anna.maria.jonsson@sh.se 
 M.  Boström 
 School of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences ,  Örebro University , 
 SE-701 82  Örebro ,  Sweden 
 e-mail: magnus.bostrom@oru.se 
 M.  Dreyer 
 DIALOGIK ,  Lerchenstrasse 22 ,  70176  Stuttgart ,  Germany 
 e-mail: dreyer@dialogik-expert.de 
 S.  Söderström 
 School of Natural Sciences, Technology and Environmental Studies ,  Södertörn University , 
 14189  Huddinge ,  Sweden 
 e-mail: sara.soderstrom@sh.se 
206
empirical and theoretical knowledge of risk communication and the role of the pub-
lic, we fi nally suggest some ways for improvement. 
 Keywords  Stakeholder participation •  Ecosystem approach to management • 
 Public involvement •  News media •  Framing 
9.1  Introduction and Background 
9.1.1  Background 
 Trans-boundary  environmental risks that affect us all over the globe have raised a 
need for new political spaces, political identities and the emergence of a global  civil 
society (Castells  2008 ). This transformation of society has among other things made 
the concept of governance relevant for describing a new situation for dealing with 
 environmental policies and risks, involving different actors at different levels. 
Despite several initiatives to counteract negative trends, it is clear that human activ-
ities still cause severe environmental problems and risks which means that struc-
tures and processes for environmental governance have to be improved (cf. Gilek 
et al.  2011 ). According to Renn ( 2008 ), risk governance consists of four phases: 
pre- assessment , appraisal, evaluation and management. Risk communication is in 
different ways included in all of these and therefore can be considered as a key 
component of risk governance. In this chapter, we focus on institutionalised forms 
of risk communication and especially on risk communication with and to the public 
with regard to environmental governance of the Baltic Sea. 
 The implementation of the  ecosystem approach to management (EAM) has been 
identifi ed as a key means for achieving a healthy marine environment. For example, 
in the Baltic Sea region (BSR), environmental risk governance strategies have so far 
not been designed to deliver the holistic appraisals and integrated management that 
would be required by this approach (Dreyer et al.  2011 ; Hassler et al.  2013 ; 
HELCOM  2010 ; McGlade  2010 ). The application of EAM in BSR has been a cen-
tral pillar of HELCOM’s Baltic Sea Action Plan ( BSAP ) from 2007 (HELCOM 
 2007 ). EAM is identifi ed as a means to address major pressures affecting the Baltic 
Sea marine environment in a more integrated and effective manner (cf. Karlsson 
et al.  2011 ). The EU has also endorsed EAM in different directives (Dreyer et al. 
 2011 ), and previous research has shown that  deliberation processes are also vital for 
the implementation of it (Dreyer et al.  2014 ). 
 In this chapter, we discuss forms, opportunities and challenges for risk commu-
nication and the role of the public in implementing EAM in environmental and 
regional governance, using BSR as a case. Besides being an ecologically and politi-
cally highly diverse and important region to study in itself, BSR is held forward as 
a pioneer for introducing new forms of environmental governance (cf. Joas et al. 
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 2008 ). Environmental governance of the Baltic Sea is not only a case of regional 
governance but also linked to the area of marine governance (see, e.g. van Leeuwen 
and Kern  2013 ). Even if BSR is a particular case, the RISKGOV project (cf. 
Introduction in this book) has contributed knowledge relevant for the wider fi elds of 
regional, marine and environmental governance. We argue, accordingly, that results 
presented in this chapter are relevant for the understanding of (public) risk commu-
nication, within a cross-country governance context, in general. 
 Various actors (e.g. policy-makers, social scientists, etc.) agree that for societies 
to be able to manage and govern global risks, there is a need for improved transna-
tional communication, more harmonised decision-making and multi-stakeholder 
 participation as well as for the increased involvement of  citizens through  informa-
tion and  dialogue . In the policy-making context, this is described as ‘good gover-
nance’ (cf. Whiteside  2006 ). For example, the  Aarhus Convention ( 1998 ) emphasises 
the role of public  deliberation in environmental decision-making. So too do the  EU 
directive on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), the EU Sixth Environmental 
Action Programme (European Commission  2001a )  1 and the  European Commission’s 
White Paper on European Governance (European Commission  2001b ). From a 
theoretical perspective, ‘good governance’ can also be defi ned as ‘refl exive gover-
nance’ and includes aspects like transparency, broad  participation and self-scrutiny 
(see, e.g. Boström et al.  2016 ; Hassler et al.  2013 ; Voss and Kemp  2006 ). 2 According 
to Oran Young, ‘governance’ is a wider term than government, as it is ‘a social 
function centred on efforts to steer or guide societies toward collectively benefi cial 
outcomes and away from outcomes that are collectively harmful’ ( 2009 : 12). This 
function often includes governments playing a role but is much wider comprising 
other actors from other social spheres as well. Governance is, accordingly, not 
restricted to hierarchical and top-down relations but also involves  citizens and 
stakeholders in network-like constellations. The communication model underpin-
ning this mode of governance is ‘ dialogue’ (e.g. Felt and Fochler  2010 ; Jentoft et al. 
 2007 ; Pierre and Peters  2000 ). 
 In a previous article about stakeholder  participation and communication in rela-
tion to environmental issues in BSR, Dreyer and colleagues ( 2014 ) concluded that 
it is crucial to acknowledge the role of the public, enhance efforts to communicate 
 EAM and raise public awareness of and interest in EAM, for a successful gover-
nance process and implementation of EAM. Increased public debate would also 
help to prepare the ground for ‘refl exive governance’ based on a deliberative ideal. 
At an aggregated level, the public and  citizens are important counterparts to policy- 
makers as ‘ public opinion’ , voters and grassroots movements. 
1  There is now also a seventh action programme that however does not mention public deliberation 
among the main priorities, only ‘better information’  http://ec.europa.eu/environment/newprg/
index.htm 
2  See Boström et al. ( 2016 ) for an analysis of BSR environmental governance using the theory of 
refl exive governance. 
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 Dreyer and colleagues furthermore concluded that it is a huge challenge to orga-
nise such transnational  citizen involvement in an effective and fair manner. As men-
tioned above, together with participation, increased transparency in decision-making 
processes is vital for refl exive governance. In practice however this transparency is 
seen in relation to well-organised stakeholders and representatives of different 
organisations and generally does not include the common citizen. 
 Our main argument in this chapter is that risk communication to the public (par-
ticularly in its dialogic form) is a necessary element in refl exive governance, which 
in turn is a key requirement for serious implementation of EAM and a move towards 
a more sustainable marine environment. We also argue that wide public acceptance 
of general risk policies and their underlying principles is a necessary condition in 
order to successfully implement such measures and that there is a need to focus on 
the role of the public. To better understand the forms and consequences of public 
involvement and risk communication, this chapter analytically focuses on institu-
tional arrangements and arenas for public risk communication with a main focus on 
the  news media given its ability to infl uence frames and agendas. These are some of 
the main factors that shape the relationship between the general public and policy- 
makers in the fi eld of political communication (cf. Mazzoleni and Schulz  1999 ; 
Schulz  2004 ; Strömbäck  2008 ). 
9.1.2  Aim and Questions 
 Against this background, the overarching  purpose of this chapter is to describe and 
discuss conditions for risk communication in relation to the fi ve main environmen-
tal risks in BSR, with a particular focus on communication with and to the larger 
public. We also suggest possible pathways to encourage aspects of risk communica-
tion that facilitate refl exive governance and implementation of  EAM . We will 
empirically explore the following questions:
 1.  What are the existing institutional arrangements and procedures of risk commu-
nication at the regional (Baltic Sea) level?  What  forms of communication can we 
identify (linear vs. dialogue, formal vs. informal, etc.)? 
 2.  What is the role of public risk communication in environmental risk governance 
of BSR, and how can this communication be understood and characterised? 
 3.  What role can be ascribed to different kinds of  news media ? What is the role of 
 framing , arenas and agendas? 
 The empirical data used for analysis in this chapter is drawn from fi ve case stud-
ies, which were conducted in the RISKGOV project. The case studies analyse the 
governance of the marine environmental risks of eutrophication (Haahti et al.  2010 ), 
invasive alien species (IAS) (Lemke et al.  2010 ),  overfi shing (Sellke et al.  2010 ),  oil 
discharges (Hassler et al.  2010 ) and  chemical pollution (Udovyk et al.  2010 ) with 
respect to three governance dimensions, one of which is ‘processes of stakeholder 
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communication’. A common analytical framework guided all fi ve case studies 
ensuring the comparability of the cases, which were performed using similar 
research designs (cf. Gilek et al.  2011 ). All case studies employed an explorative- 
interpretative approach of qualitative social research, and their results have been 
derived from three main sources: document analysis, semi-structured qualitative 
interviews and a series of round-table events. This allows us to draw conclusions 
about communicative aspects of environmental governance of BSR, whereas we 
will also when possible use the case of BSR to discuss regional and marine environ-
mental governance more generally. 
 In the next section, we will introduce our main theoretical perspectives that focus 
on risk communication in environmental governance, risk communication with and 
to the public and the role of the  news media . We will then turn to our analysis of the 
empirical material and start with a discussion about existing institutional arrange-
ments and procedures of risk communication and the forms of communication that 
can be identifi ed. Thereafter we address the topic of risk communication with the 
public and how this communication can be understood and characterised with a 
special focus on arenas for communication and the role of the media. Finally, we 
conclude the chapter with a discussion on the role of public risk communication in 
(regional) environmental risk governance and possible ways forward. 
9.2  Theoretical Perspectives 
9.2.1  Environmental Governance and Risk Communication 
 We use the concept of risk communication as defi ned in the 1989 report on 
‘Improving Risk Communication’, produced by the Committee on Risk Perception 
and Communications of the US National Research Council (NRC). The report 
argues that risk communication is:
 […] an interactive process of exchange of information and opinion among individuals, 
groups and institutions. It involves multiple messages about the nature of risk and other 
messages, not strictly about risk, that express concerns, opinions or reactions to risk mes-
sages or to legal and institutional arrangements for risk management. (US NRC  1989 : 1) 
 Risk communication is a fundamental part of environmental risk governance (cf. 
Renn  2008 ), but can also be seen as part of the wider notion of environmental com-
munication. Environmental communication by Cox is defi ned as ‘the pragmatic and 
constitutive vehicle for our understanding of the environment as well as our rela-
tionships to the natural world; it is the symbolic medium that we use in constructing 
 environmental problems and negotiating society’s different response to them’ (Cox 
 2010 : 20). Contemporary risks are rarely a fi rst-hand experience, but something 
communicated through different channels of  information fl ows in today’s modern 
society. Risk communication is a fi eld of research that addresses communication 
between experts and the public, or as it has traditionally been, risk information 
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given to the public by experts. Renn ( 2008 ) identifi es four different types of risk 
communication: documentation, information,  dialogue and involvement. 
 Communication as it is used in this context thus includes on the one hand the 
provision of information (which in some respects also includes documentation) and 
on the other hand  dialogue and involvement. These two forms are like two different 
models of communication (see, e.g. Fiske  1990 ). It is relevant to distinguish between 
them in analyses of governance activities even if there are obvious overlaps between 
the two. 
 In general, research in risk communication still rests on a traditional, and in some 
sense obsolete, notion of communication as a linear process, which might be suc-
cessful but could also fail. This notion has its roots in the classical source-receiver 
model where a message is sent from a source to a transmitter who decodes it and 
sends it towards the receiver, the audience (Cox  2010 ; Fiske  1990 ). The model has 
been applied and somewhat amended to fi t patterns of science and risk communica-
tion; where the  sources consist of, for example, scientists, public agencies, interest 
groups and/or eye witnesses; where the  transmitters are mass media, public institu-
tions, interest groups and opinion leaders; and where the  receivers include the gen-
eral public, specifi c target audiences, group members or exposed individuals. 
Traditionally risk communication studies have had a focus on the means of trans-
mission as well as on the composition of the message and the ability to persuade the 
audience in a particular way with the main aim of changing audience behaviour 
(Breakwell  2007 ). Traditionally the communication of risk messages thus has 
mainly been about experts ‘informing’ the public (e.g. with regard to the public’s 
‘right-to-know’). 
 The view of seeing communication solely as a one-way endeavour (from 
‘experts’ to ‘laymen’) has in many ways been abandoned on behalf of a more inclu-
sive and process-oriented view of communication. Here, communication is seen as 
evolving through systems and networks over time and within deliberate decision- 
making about risks (Breakwell  2007 ; Renn  2008 ). This linear model has been criti-
cised for ‘…its naive conception of the public. It views them as passive recipients 
of information, taking no account of how the  information they receive will interact 
with their pre-existing knowledge and attitudes and ignoring any demands they may 
have for what they learn to be relevant to their individual situation’ (Gregory and 
Miller  2000 : 97). 
 Public  participation and its conceptualisation in risk policy have thus shifted 
from a technical one-way communication towards a more inclusive approach, in 
which there is a ‘two-way  learning’ between science and society (Pidgeon et al. 
 2006 ). Here we see a parallel development in the fi eld of science communication 
with a shift from the defi cit model with its focus on  informing the public for the 
purpose of increasing scientifi c knowledge among  citizens and thus fostering more 
positive attitudes towards science to a more dialogical ideal, expressed in Bucchis’ 
ideas on avoiding the transfer paradigm and instead seeing communication as a 
‘crosstalk’ and a ‘double helix’ with one strand representing scientifi c discourse and 
the other representing public discourse (Bucchi  2004 ). 
A.M. Jönsson et al.
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9.2.2  Why Involve the Public? 
 From the perspective of the so-called civic science,  citizens and the public have a 
stake in the science-politics interface, an interface that can no longer be viewed as 
an arena for scientifi c experts and policy-makers only (Bäckstrand  2003 ). So what 
do we mean by the ‘public’? In governance theory the public is generally framed as 
 concerned publics, meaning those affected by decisions, or what Beck ( 1992 :61) 
describes as ‘the voices of the side effects’. Models of  deliberative democracy and 
the  public sphere however refer to  citizens in general and the notion of the public 
interest (Dahlgren  2005 ; Habermas  1989 ). Both these perspectives point to the dif-
fi culty of defi ning what is at stake for the public – i.e. what is ‘the public interest’ – 
and who represents the ‘general citizen’. Researchers working on the public/science/
policy interface point, for example, to problems with participatory processes in rela-
tion to the question of whom the public actually represents and the type of people 
interested in participating (Janse and Konijnendijk  2007 ). In this chapter, we con-
sider stakeholders as organised interest groups and the public as unorganised, rep-
resenting the individual citizen. 
 Risk communication with the public implies taking into account the values, 
knowledge and experience of citizens. Such inclusion can improve governance and 
also make decisions more legitimate, robust and easier to implement (see, e.g. 
Stirling  2005 ; Whiteside  2006 ). Public involvement affects how problems and solu-
tions are identifi ed and defi ned since participants can have a great infl uence on how 
issues are framed. In the fi elds of science and risk communication, much attention 
has been directed towards the role of deliberative activities and processes for public 
 participation and communication. Such activities include public hearings, confer-
ences and advisory groups (see, e.g. Brake and Weitkamp  2009 ; Hagendijk and 
Irwin  2006 ; Lidskog et al.  2010 ). 
 A major  incentive for activating public  dialogue processes is to restore the pub-
lic’s confi dence in government authorities including risk regulators, although many 
argue that increased public communication and a democratised scientifi c process 
are also good things in themselves. Increased public involvement may reduce, for 
example, mutual distrust. However, certain drawbacks of public involvement may 
appear. Increased transparency and public debate regarding complex and uncertain 
risk issues may result in increasing worries and larger unpredictability of risk per-
ception and behaviour (cf. Frewer  2003 ). This in turn could be problematic for an 
effi cient governance process (cf. Irwin  2008 ). 
 According to Ortwin Renn, to communicate risk to the public is a diffi cult task 
(Renn  2008 ). Risk communication comprises several essential dimensions including 
education/enlightenment of the audience and risk training for involved parties to 
cope with the risks and to build up confi dence in risk management as well as to help 
create confi dence towards risk handling institutions, it also enhances cooperation and 
confl ict resolution in risk-related decision-making processes. These specifi c func-
tions of risk communication all require slightly different forms of communication, 
including documentation,  information , mutual dialogue and involvement. In risk 
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communication the issue of  credibility is of key importance and so too the ability to 
catch those who are potentially interested (Renn  2008 ). 
9.2.3  Risk Communication and the Public Sphere 
 To acknowledge the role of the  public in risk governance and communication is at 
least a twofold endeavour. On the one hand, it is about including the public as  citi-
zens (organised and individually) in governance processes via, for example, hear-
ings. On the other hand, it is about raising awareness and making these issues a 
prominent part of the public discourse putting them on the public agenda. Political 
decisions are widely affected by the relationship between the agendas and frames of 
policy-makers, the public and the media (cf. Asp  1986 ). The  news media and public 
debate are essential for communication between policy-makers and the public and 
for creating common agendas and  framing risks. Over the last decade, so-called 
social media like Twitter and Facebook have also been a tool for policy-makers to 
communicate with and inform the general public. 
 The media is also an arena for public representation and for different forms of 
 participation (such as submitting letters to editors or writing opinion pieces), not 
least when it comes to environmental risk issues (cf. Egan Sjölander and Jönsson 
 2012 ). Media and journalism studies have highlighted that the  news media gener-
ally articulates an elitist discourse (see, e.g. Shoemaker and Reese  1996 ), something 
that is the case with regard to environmental news as well. Spokespersons from 
government and industry dictate the discourse of environmental news, while the 
views of ‘ordinary’  citizens or ‘side effects’ (cf. Beck  1992 ) are much more rare (cf. 
Cox  2010 ). Research also shows that those who appear in the news are able to infl u-
ence on how a problem is framed in terms of causes and solutions (see, e.g. Entman 
 1993 ). 
 The concept of  framing has roots in both psychology and sociology and in the 
work of sociologist Erving Goffman. Goffman discusses framing as an interpretive 
framework that helps individuals to process  information (Goffman  1974 ; Pan and 
Kosicki  1993 ). In the fi eld of policy-making theory and political sociology, the 
concept of framing is often used to analyse how actors are actively involved in 
debating, defi ning and setting a particular agenda and furthering its implementation 
(Rein and Schön  1993 ). 
 The concept of framing can be used in different kinds of analyses and has been 
applied in studies of stakeholder  participation and communication within gover-
nance processes (see, e.g. De Marchi  2003 ; Dreyer et al.  2014 ; Jönsson  2011 ). Risks 
are inherently diffi cult to communicate as different interpretations and implications 
are bound to emerge. Framing is the work of defi ning and answering questions like: 
What is at stake? What is the risk? What is the cause and effect (Entman  1993 ; 
Schön and Rein  1994 )? 
 Framing is an essential component in all phases of risk management (while per-
haps particularly important in the pre- assessment stage; see Linke et al.  2011 ). 
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Framing denotes processes in which actors deal with social and ecological  com-
plexity . Stakeholders develop their arguments through frames, and these frames 
also help them fi nd common ground for negotiations and compromises. Policy- 
making processes may stimulate rich debates and refl ection both within and across 
frames, making stakeholders and the general public able to develop arguments, 
debate and refl ect critically on policy statements. Used refl ectively, frames such as 
the ecosystem approach,  biodiversity ,  overfi shing ,  precaution , sustainability and 
many others are useful for perceiving and understanding sets of problems in novel 
ways. The multilayered character of these frames may open up interpretative fl exi-
bility (cf. Klintman and Boström  2008 ). Such fl exibility provides both barriers and 
 bridges to communication. 
 Framing as such can also be viewed in light of communication and media texts. 
Robert Entman ( 1993 : 52), doing exactly that, defi nes framing in the following 
manner: ‘To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them 
more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular prob-
lem defi nition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommen-
dation for the item described’. In this setting, frames can be said to defi ne the 
problem, diagnose the causes, make moral statements and also suggest solutions to 
the problem at hand, even though a frame does not necessarily have to include all 
elements (Entman  1993 ). Media framing functions as a way to construct a specifi c 
environmental issue and elicit a response or conclusion from the media recipients 
(Hansen  2010 ). 
 In the next section, we will present our empirical fi ndings and analyse risk com-
munication in relation to our selected fi ve environmental risk issues relevant to the 
Baltic Sea. 
9.3  Results: Risk Communication in BSR 
9.3.1  Institutionalised Risk Communication 
 The main fi nding from our cases is that there are few, if any, actual examples of 
systematic institutionalised public risk communication in BSR. There are also a 
lack of regional and transnational networks and communicative structures for  infor-
mation sharing with and involvement of the public. However, there are some excep-
tions as discussed below. 
 In many cases, HELCOM is the main actor in risk communication. Among other 
things, this organisation serves as a communicative platform and meeting place for 
different actors and interests (Hassler et al.  2013 ; Van Deever  2011 ). In the eutro-
phication case, HELCOM, with its Baltic Sea Action Plan, is seen as one of the 
main players (Haahti et al.  2010 ). The structure within HELCOM makes it possible 
for stakeholders such as NGOs to communicate and contribute knowledge. 
According to the case study report on  chemical pollution , the EU and HELCOM are 
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platforms of communication for politicians and authorities, but not for independent 
single scientists or laboratories (Udovyk et al.  2010 ). The European Environmental 
Agency (EEA), the European Green Spider Network (consisting of communication 
offi cers from national environmental ministries and agencies in Europe and sup-
ported by the DG Environment of the  European Commission ) and IMPEL are other 
organisations or networks that aim to distribute and communicate information 
regarding environmental risks in, for example, the BSR. 
 There is of course also communication within and among the different organs of 
the EU. However, the  complexity of the EU creates diffi culties for communication 
inside the organisation. This is, for example, noted in the eutrophication case study 
where communication between authorities at the national level is less about institu-
tionalised formal communication, but instead about informal communication and 
personal contacts and networks, created through a tight interplay between science 
and policy (Haahti et al.  2010 ; Linke et al.  2014 ). This reliance on informal com-
munication and personal contacts is also noted in the case of  hazardous chemicals , 
as illustrated in the following quote from an offi cial from a Swedish state authority: 
‘It is important to know the right people and have a network of contacts. If you send 
a letter to the agency, you will never know where it will end up’ (Udovyk et al. 
 2010 : 48). These personal contacts are not often easily applied across the entire 
BSR (Udovyk et al.  2010 ). 
 The lack  of  communication and tools and platforms for successful communica-
tion is often identifi ed as a barrier to risk management and implementation. An 
example of this is that of IAS. According to the case study report on IAS, coopera-
tion and communication between the key stakeholders was highly unsatisfactory. 
The weak communication between the main players, together with the lack of pub-
lic debate, was identifi ed as the main reason for low public awareness on the IAS 
issue (Lemke et al.  2010 ). 
 Overfi shing is the risk area with the most established forms of regional risk com-
munication. The communication takes place through  Regional Advisory Councils 
(RACs) , like the one established for the Baltic Sea in 2006 (cf. Linke et al.  2011 ). 
RACs are advisory institutions set up by the EU Commission with representatives 
from the  fi shing industry and different environmental groups (NGOs) and are often 
put forward as an innovative example of regional stakeholder participation (Linke 
and Jentoft  2013 ; Sellke et al.  2010 ). If broad inclusion is the ideal for risk gover-
nance, it is necessary to not have a static idea of who stakeholders are. A static view 
of stakeholders presupposes what issues are at stake and who is to be seen as hold-
ing a stake in that issue. In fact, the very defi nition of who the legitimate stakehold-
ers are is part of the framing process. Governance structures, including organisations 
and institutions, shape these framing processes. 
 Offi cials of the German Fisheries Association stressed during an interview that 
the BS RAC is a forum for ‘entering into real  dialogue with other stakeholders, 
scientists and Commission offi cials’ (Sellke et al.  2010 : 29). We found that the most 
advanced form of  regionalisation among our fi ve case studies was in the area of 
 fi shing with RACs as the main example of multi-stakeholder regionalised advice 
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procedures. There is however a critique directed towards the RAC system both from 
stakeholders themselves (environmental NGOs complain about the power asym-
metries that benefi t the fi shing industry) and among scholars. Linke et al. ( 2011 ) 
suggest that a basic problem with RACs is a mismatch between the  participation 
purpose (knowledge inclusion) and the stage in the governance process at which 
RACs are formally positioned (evaluation of management proposals). Their conclu-
sion is that if the aim is to broaden the knowledge base of fi sheries management, 
stakeholders need to be included earlier in the governance process (cf. Linke et al. 
 2011 ). 
9.3.2  Forms and Platforms for Public Risk Communication 
 As mentioned above, Renn ( 2008 ) identifi es four different forms or kinds of risk 
communication: documentation,  information ,  dialogue and involvement. We fi nd 
examples of all of these in our cases. In the cases of oil transportation,  overfi shing 
and eutrophication, communication can be characterised as one way from authori-
ties to a wider public. It appears in the form of information such as statements, press 
releases and reports. Two-way communication and dialogue are sometimes estab-
lished via different projects, which often include organised stakeholders as partners 
but not links to the general public. For example, in the case of eutrophication, 
research projects such as the Baltic COMPASS (Comprehensive Policy Actions and 
Investments in Sustainable Solutions in  Agriculture in the Baltic Sea Region) and 
Baltic DEAL (Putting Best Practices in Agriculture into Work) involve farmers in 
BSR in the research process (see Haahti et al.  2010 ). 
 There are different media and tools for communication to and with the public, for 
example, eco-labels, documents, reports, articles, laws and  regulation , meetings and 
seminars. Our results point to the preference for using  digital media platforms and 
webpages. Different actors however use different forms of communication. Whereas 
scientists use reports and articles, NGOs focus more on the use of the Internet and 
the organisations’ webpages to inform the public. Through these channels, NGOs 
provide  information , discussion forums and ideas on what the individual  citizen can 
do to prevent or mitigate Baltic Sea-related problems. 
 Awareness raising constitutes a key part of HELCOM’s communication policy. 
Its website states that ‘An essential objective is to raise general public awareness of 
the Baltic Sea and HELCOM actions’ (quoted in Dreyer et al.  2011 ). HELCOM 
also uses its website to communicate to a wider audience. Through its website 
HELCOM provides a large amount of publicly accessible documentation and infor-
mation on the fi ve cases. The  information formats used, for example, indicator fact 
sheets and thematic reports, are primarily produced for targeted users at national 
and Baltic-wide levels. The website mainly meets the information needs of those 
who already express an interest in marine environmental risk governance. This is 
also the case with RACs in the fi sheries case and relates to the question of who is 
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framed and considered as a ‘legitimate’ stakeholder. However, HELCOM also uses 
other forms of communication that can better reach the interested  citizen or 
 consumer . These include information brochures, videos and television and radio 
series, 3 all with the potential to raise the awareness of those who have as yet not 
taken an interest in the issues so far (Dreyer et al.  2011 ). 
 A signifi cant amount of documentation and  information related to environmental 
issues at national and EU levels is made available to the public through the websites 
of responsible authorities. Some websites also provide more specifi c information. 
Take for example actors dealing with chemicals like the Swedish Chemicals Agency 
(KEMI) that has an established and widely used website with a large number of 
databases and up-to-date information. In the area of fi sheries, industry representa-
tives have designed a website ( www.portal-fi scherei-portal.de ) that aims to deliver 
information to the public. This is, according to the interviewees, mainly a response 
to the media  framing of  overfi shing (Sellke et al.  2010 ). A wealth of information – 
from general to highly detailed, much of this related to risk  assessment matters – is 
made available on the website of the  International Council for the Exploration of the 
Sea (ICES) . The case studies in our project do not provide examples of any websites 
of responsible authorities that attempt to respond to the particular concerns of the 
general  citizen . This is different from risk communication related to, for example, 
food safety issues (cf. Dreyer et al.  2011 ). 
 WWF employs a traffi c light system as a popularised way of informing the pub-
lic (or in this case the  consumers ) about the sustainability practices related to par-
ticular fi shes sold in the supermarket. Also green marketing, certifi cation and 
labelling are used as tools for bringing simple and concise types of  information to 
the public. A special form of communication, which is mainly used in business-to- 
business relations or business-to-authority relations used in the case of  hazardous 
chemicals , is the so-called MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheets). 
 Actors such as industries and NGOs (with enough resources) also engage in lob-
bying activities in the EU and national forums for decision-making. NGOs can 
themselves work as communicative brokers between other actors. There are a num-
ber of research projects concerning governance of risks in BSR. To the extent that 
these projects include researchers and other stakeholders, they can be seen as com-
municative platforms for  deliberation and a meeting point for different actors. 4 
However, these activities seldom include the ordinary  citizen . 
3  See, for example, the HELCOM radio series ‘The Baltic – a sea of change’ and the TV series ‘The 
Baltic – sea of surprises’, available at the HELCOM interactive webpage ( http://agripollute.nstl.
gov.cn/MirrorResources/10221/index.html ). 
4  The RISKGOV project, for example, organised three round tables where researchers met with 
policy-makers, NGO representatives and scientists (reports from these round tables can be found 
in the RISKGOV project homepage  www.sh.se/riskgov ). 
A.M. Jönsson et al.
217
9.3.3  The Role(s) of the Public 
 Our results clearly show that actors differ in their views on public risk communica-
tion. While some consider involvement of the public fundamental, others underline 
the importance of expert knowledge. These positions partly refl ect different national 
cultures and thus most likely refl ect different ideals of democracy and the role of the 
public in different countries. The role of the public is, for example, often under-
played by interviewees from Russia, who instead underline the importance of expert 
knowledge (Udovyk et al.  2010 ). It is mostly NGOs who highlight the importance 
of communication and public involvement, something that is particularly evident in 
the  overfi shing case (Sellke et al.  2010 ) and in the case of  hazardous chemicals 
(Udovyk et al.  2010 ). It could be argued that NGOs, in general, build on the idea of 
public  information and involvement. 
 From our case studies, it is also obvious that the public generally is not involved 
or addressed in the risk  assessment phase but rather (if at all) in the risk manage-
ment or implementation phase. Risk assessment generally does not include  dialogue 
with the public, and the communication phase is mainly about informing the public. 
Take for example the  overfi shing case, which otherwise has the most advanced 
system for stakeholder interaction: ‘Overall, interviewees did not see a need for 
more specifi c public  participation within the governance process. Communication 
with the public was mainly seen in terms of  information providing’ (Sellke et al. 
 2010 : 32). The importance of informing the public – often framed in terms of the 
public’s ‘right-to-know’ (RTK) – has received increased attention in risk gover-
nance processes of BSR. In the case of information provision regarding chemicals, 
the pollutant release and transfer registers can be seen as examples of legally bind-
ing implementation of RTK (Udovyk et al.  2010 ). 
 Risk  assessment has become an important tool for informing risk managers and 
the general public about the different options for protecting public health and the 
environment (Udovyk et al.  2010 ). Some of the interviewees, for example, from DG 
Mare, saw the different national parliaments as representatives of the public, empha-
sising that there is no need for further public involvement in the governance process 
(cf. Sellke et al.  2010 ). 
 A main fi nding is that the public is mainly addressed and thought of in their role 
as  consumers and less so as in their role of political  citizens . For example, several 
actors in the chemical case, in the  overfi shing case and in the IAS case see the 
responsibility of citizens in terms of them being consumers. In the case of  hazard-
ous chemicals , consumers are often portrayed as responsible for speeding up the 
process of change (Udovyk et al.  2010 ). It appeared from our interviews that the 
topic of ‘sustainable consumption’ is gaining importance and becoming a central 
part of future risk communication. Today, the topic of ‘sustainable consumption’ 
seems to be of most importance in public risk communication in the overfi shing 
case (Sellke et al.  2010 ). Food/eco-labels like  MSC have become highly infl uential 
in the last decade. 
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 The public as  consumers are, however, thought of in different ways in the fi ve 
cases. According to Agenda 21 that addresses education in BSR, it is important that 
the work towards a sustainable society equips  citizens with education and training 
and raises public awareness (Baltic 21  2002 ). However, according to our knowl-
edge, there are no Baltic Sea regional organisations that develop and carry out tar-
geted educational campaigns in any of the fi ve risk issues. We are not aware of any 
cases where it is either discussed or specifi ed how public awareness should be raised 
and whose responsibility this is. 
9.3.4  The Role of the News Media 
 There are  different barriers to  public  participation and communication in environ-
mental governance and decision-making. First, there are structural factors including 
lack of opportunities and resources to participate. The other main problem seems to 
be a lack of interest from the public (Zavestoski et al.  2006 ), something that at least 
in part could be explained by differences in agenda between scientists, policy- 
makers and citizens. Previous studies of communication in marine governance pro-
cedures underline the importance of common agendas. Experiences of stakeholder 
communication and participation reveal that it is diffi cult to recruit  citizens to par-
ticipate in deliberative procedures such as hearings (RISKGOV  2011 ). One possi-
ble reason is that the concerned issues are not part of the public’s agenda. 
 We see a relationship between the amount of media reporting and action taken. 
In  Sweden and  Germany , national  news media have, for example, widely acknowl-
edged the issue of  overfi shing , and the extent and content of reporting has induced 
public authorities to take corrective action through highly targeted  information pro-
vision. There is however less  incentive for regional organisations like HELCOM to 
take such actions because of the lack of reporting and a common agenda at the 
regional (i.e. transnational) level (cf. Dreyer et al.  2011 ; Jönsson  2011 ). This lack of 
a regional public arena and agenda supported by the mass media makes it more dif-
fi cult to raise awareness of regional environmental risk issues among the public of 
that region. The media can play an important role in the development of common 
agendas on a national level (cf. McCombs  2005 ; McCombs and Shaw  1972 ), which 
in turn is crucial for generating interest from  citizens and  consumers (cf. Dreyer 
et al.  2011 ). The reasons that common agendas are important are because they place 
a certain (risk) issue on the agenda that may consequently enhance (public) engage-
ment and increase the possibility and quality of (public)  participation , which will 
result in improved (risk) management and policy implementation. In this process, 
the media and its  agenda-setting function (cf. McCombs and Shaw  1972 ) is of 
utmost importance. The basic logic behind the ‘agenda-setting’ concept is that there 
is a relationship between the amount of attention a certain issue receives in the  news 
media and the extent to which the public consider this issue to be of special impor-
tance. This thus also means that in order to become part of the public agenda, news 
about environmental risks in relation to the Baltic Sea must be considered 
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 newsworthy. In today’s media society, with its many communication channels and 
platforms, it is a challenge to reach out with messages. While agenda-setting theory 
mainly focuses on issues that are reported,  framing in the context of media studies 
is about how issues are presented. 
 Previous studies of how  news media frame environmental risks in relation to the 
Baltic Sea show that eutrophication together with  overfi shing receives the most 
media attention. This situation could be explained at least partly by the fact that the 
media focuses on stories that the  consumer can identify with best (Jönsson  2011 ). 
The issue of  hazardous chemicals on the other hand receives relatively little atten-
tion in the news media and is not on top of the public agenda. According to inter-
viewees, chemical risks are framed in the media in a very narrow health-centred 
way related to eating contaminated fi sh (Udovyk et al.  2010 ). 
 Clearly, the conditions to achieve cultural resonance – the ‘success’ of the ‘prob-
lem’ – relate to possibilities of visualising the problem and reaching out to the 
media. The diffi culty of visualising  chemical pollution and the lack of media report-
ing were issues that interviewees mentioned (Udovyk et al.  2010 ). There was also 
less reporting on oil spills during the studied period (Jönsson  2011 ). Yet, oil spills 
can be easily visualised by the media and framed as an ‘immediate threat’ or ‘pend-
ing danger’. However, in the case of oil spills, what is generally disseminated to the 
public is mostly just one side of the coin. Big accidents are always reported, whereas 
the more common (routinised) intentional oil spills are not (Hassler et al.  2010 ). 
This is because the media prioritises the most acute and spectacular issues, conse-
quently resulting in the marginalisation of small catastrophes that are seen as ‘nor-
mal’ and not ‘newsworthy’ (cf. Anderson  1997 ; Hannigan  2006 ; Hansen  2010 ; 
Shoemaker and Reese  1996 ). Few other risk issues give rise to such intense reac-
tions as when birds or seals are portrayed as caught in black oil, fi ghting for their 
lives. This often comes with pictures of voluntary workers removing oil from 
beaches and seashores. This type of catastrophe or big event  framing , together with 
the visualisation component, can affect the kinds of societal responses that are 
expected of the public (cf. Hassler et al.  2010 ). In contrast, intentional oil spills, 
similar to IAS, are not issues of high priority in framing and campaigning activities 
of environmental NGOs, which is partly because NGOs too are constrained by 
‘media logic’. 
 Of our selected fi ve cases, the issue of IAS appears to receive the lowest degree 
of media and public attention, in particular in the post-Soviet countries (Jönsson 
 2011 ; Lemke et al.  2010 ). IAS, in comparison to the other issues, is still new in the 
public’s imagination in BSR (cf. Hansen  2010 ). Neither are environmental NGOs in 
general engaged in  framing efforts targeted towards pushing the issue of  alien spe-
cies onto the public agenda nor are they mobilising support for a more developed 
risk policy. They do not appear to consider it a prioritised problem (Lemke et al. 
 2010 ). All in all this will affect policy outcomes. ‘Since public awareness is related 
to political involvement and support, low awareness associated with IAS is treated 
by policy-makers as a public consent to neglect the issue especially in the context of 
non-ratifi ed legal acts’. (Lemke et al.  2010 : 55). There is accordingly no  signifi cant 
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public pressure on, for example, HELCOM contracting parties to speed up the 
 ratifi cation process or consider more detailed  and  binding regulations. 
9.3.5  The EAM and Public Risk Communication 
 Another general fi nding is that there is only very limited EAM-related risk com-
munication targeted at the general public and that  EAM has not (yet) become part 
of public discourse at national and transnational (BSR) levels. Public awareness of 
EAM is limited because there is a lack of news coverage at the regional level 
(Dreyer et al.  2011 ; Jönsson  2011 ). Also, the mass media seem rather unwilling to 
report on EAM. The reason for this is probably its low news value; it is not a thrill-
ing or original story and in fact somewhat old-fashioned. Currently, public debate is 
not a likely source of pressure on stakeholders to become more engaged with EAM 
and its guiding principles (Dreyer et al.  2014 ). EAM is thus not yet, at least in BSR, 
part of either the public debate or agenda or part of public values and imagination. 
The ecological challenge is not yet a ‘hot topic’ for BSR as a whole. Having said 
that, there are differences between different risks and problem areas in terms of 
public attention given to them. 
 Although the EAM concept can potentially facilitate refl ection and communica-
tion among at least some of the key actors in risk governance, it lacks essential char-
acteristics that are necessary for it to become central to a new societal paradigm, 
which could push all different actors central to Baltic Sea environmental governance 
to jointly deliberate over and act upon it with regard to the fi ve risk issues (Dreyer 
et al.  2011 ). Besides from being rather invisible in public discourse, EAM is used 
differently and of a different level of importance to the fi ve risk cases. In, for exam-
ple, the oil spill case, it was reported that some of the key actors interviewed had 
never encountered the term before (Hassler et al.  2010 ). While many or even most 
interviewees seem to welcome the EAM concept, it is certainly less clear if this 
frame helps in the development of mutual understandings of risk. An interesting fi nd-
ing was found in the case of  overfi shing , where NGO representatives claimed that 
communication actually could be improved by EAM since it creates a common 
agenda and discourse (Sellke et al.  2010 ). Of course, it is also necessary to defi ne 
what EAM really is while  framing the problem and whether or not it is a ‘utopian 
vision’, as some interviewees claim,  or  a fruitful way forward that alone can help 
achieve the goal of sustainable development, as claimed by some. All in all, the 
abstract and complex nature of EAM appears to be a barrier to its adoption and com-
munication across various actor groups. Governance of environmental risks and 
implementation of EAM require balancing different and often confl icting interests 
and values. Shared frames and agendas would, for example, enhance the possibility 
for successful risk governance. Platforms targeted at developing and implementing a 
more integrated approach and discursive space to address risks related to EAM are 
essential. These platforms and discursive spaces are needed to facilitate communica-
tion and understanding between diverse stakeholders in  relation to particular risk 
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issues and across the different sectors that are affected by these risks. Such 
platforms are missing in our risk cases (cf. Dreyer et al.  2011 ). It is also clear from 
our cases that risk communication in BSR today does not make much use of  digital 
media platforms. In the digitalised network society we live in, there are a number of 
possibilities to ‘meet’ and communicate made available by different virtual plat-
forms, even if in practice, these possibilities are not used to their full potential (cf. 
Jönsson  2012 ; Zavestoski  2006 ). 
9.3.6  Bridges and Barriers for Public Risk Communication 
 It can be concluded that  while the fi ve environmental risks are all established as 
environmental policy issues at different political levels including that of BSR 
(mainly through HELCOM and the EU), they are generally poorly represented and 
to different degrees in public discourse in the region. A certain level of public 
awareness is required in order to move towards more effective regionalised envi-
ronmental risk governance as aimed at by HELCOM in particular (Dreyer et al. 
 2011 ). 
 Governance of marine environments often involves particular challenges for  par-
ticipation and communication due to the fact that many marine environments 
include several different actors and states. In the case of BSR, some challenges for 
regional governance such as a lack of a historic regional identity have been identi-
fi ed as signifi cant (cf. Dreyer et al.  2014 ). It is worth considering that the Baltic Sea 
is a rather heterogeneous area where countries display rather divergent historical 
and contemporary traits while also having different ideas about, for example, 
democracy and public participation (Vangas  2010 ). 
 As discussed above, risk communication can be a bridge for environmental gov-
ernance and a step towards sustainability and  EAM . At the same time, nonexistent 
or not-working risk communication can be a barrier. Common arenas and agendas 
for communication are of great importance for risk communication with the public, 
but it is also crucial that all parties involved share the same language and concepts 
(this is also important for frame sharing). The difference in use of frames in com-
munication between experts and other actors has often been a barrier for (risk) com-
munication. So has the tendency within risk governance processes to stick to a 
narrow scientifi c/technocratic  framing . For example, in the case of  hazardous chem-
icals , one expert said: ‘The  information is really technical and it is really hard for 
common people to understand what we are doing’ (Udovyk et al.  2010 : 50). The 
role of English creates a problem particularly for delegates from Russia and other 
eastern states. One Russian journalist says ‘everything that is in English is kind of 
“silent” for Russia’ (Udovyk et al.  2010 : 48). In the area of risk communication, 
different laws and regulatory documents can be seen as tools for creating a common 
language if it establishes common objectives and a common terminology. In this 
context, language thus refers to both the use of, for example, English and the use 
and understanding of a common concept. 
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9.4  Conclusions and Ways Forward 
 That (risk) communication to the general public should be seen as an inherent ele-
ment of environmental and sustainability governance forms part of the standard 
rhetoric of transnational and intergovernmental organisations as well as authorities 
at different political levels. The need for general public support for environmental 
information as part of environmental governance in the Baltic Sea region can there-
fore not be underestimated. Environmental  information is seen as especially rele-
vant when drastic measures of risk management (such as closing commercially 
important areas for  fi shing or imposing  nutrient reductions to combat eutrophica-
tion) have to be implemented. Such measures normally result in protests and con-
fl icts as well as public debate in and through the media. Wide public acceptance of 
overall risk policy and its underlying principles – such as those at the core of  EAM – 
is a necessary condition to successfully implement such measures (cf. Dreyer et al. 
 2011 ). 
 We have identifi ed some examples of relatively well-working risk communica-
tion with parts of the organised public in BSR, such as in fi sheries or eutrophication, 
but also a number of different barriers and obstacles. Our analysis of fi ve cases 
shows a far from ideal situation from the perspective of refl exive or good gover-
nance with regard to how risk communication is conducted. Risk communication 
activities are often not fi rmly anchored in the  organisational structure of the institu-
tions responsible for risk  assessment and management and are not understood as 
integral components of the entire risk  regulation /governance process. It is also clear 
that there is no real refl ection on communication activities and whether the precise 
forms of communication and use of mediums for communication refl ect the trans-
national nature of risks under consideration, their context and whether they arouse, 
or could arouse, societal concern. Our key result from this study is that BSR con-
sists of many national institutions for risk communication, but that there are hardly 
any centralised institutions for risk communication activities relating to environ-
mental governance in the region. 
 Another key conclusion is that public risk communication in this array of cross- 
national environmental risks is restricted mainly to (one-way)  information . More 
dialogical approaches, for example, aimed at the particular needs of  citizens and 
 consumers do not play a signifi cant role. The particular nature of the fi ve risk issues 
is one reason for this lack of  dialogue since they appear to provide only few oppor-
tunities for the public to contribute to risk management. We have, however, seen 
that in the cases of  overfi shing and eutrophication, the average citizen is more or 
less directly addressed in his/her role as consumer and encouraged to move towards 
sustainable consumption. These cases are, however, mainly initiatives of environ-
mental NGOs and businesses (cf. Dreyer et al.  2011 ). 
 Against this backdrop and from our empirical and theoretical knowledge of risk 
communication and the role of the public, we suggest ways forward. We see several 
aspects that could be improved in risk communication with regard to the involve-
ment of the general public in BSR:
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 1.  First of all we argue that there is a need to more fi rmly  anchor risk communica-
tion activities into the  organisational structure of the institutions responsible for 
risk  assessment and management. Risk communication should be understood as 
an integral component of the  entire risk governance process; that is, risk com-
munication needs to be an ongoing activity during all stages of risk assessment 
and risk management, from the  framing of the issue to the  monitoring of risk 
management practice, while the target group may vary from stage to stage. 
 2.  There should be  enhanced efforts to communicate EAM to the general public by 
using a more  proactive approach. Currently,  EAM is generally perceived of as a 
rather abstract and technical concept that is unlikely to become part of the wider 
public agenda. In the context of implementing  BSAP , HELCOM (and also pub-
lic authorities at national levels) increased their efforts to communicate the EAM 
concept to journalists and other disseminators through different modes of popu-
larisation and use of illustrative examples of ecological risks and appropriate 
EAM-based solutions. This could be one way to attract more attention from the 
national media and thereby reach out to the general public. It could help make 
environmental issues more of a ‘hot topic’. It would also complement initiatives 
of environmental NGOs and the business sector that address the average  citizen 
in his/her role as  consumer (only) (through, for instance, organic consumption or 
sustainable choice of seafood). To be a responsible consumer is of course one of 
the most essential roles citizens can play. But more proactive risk communica-
tion should also invite and stimulate citizens to discuss, frame and campaign for 
a cleaner, healthier, more attractive, fair and sustainable Baltic Sea (cf. Dreyer 
et al.  2011 ). 
 3.  We also would like to point to the fact that  social scientists are not used to their 
full potential (or hardly used at all; cf. Linke and Jentoft  2014 ) and need to be 
part of all stages of risk governance. All  environmental problems are fundamen-
tally also social problems, whether we are talking about causes, understandings 
or solutions to problems. Involving social scientists in only select stages of the 
governance process is likely thus to reproduce a reductionist view and treatment. 
Social scientists are needed to broaden the perspective and highlight the social 
character of risk issues. Moreover, using social scientists as mediators in differ-
ent deliberative processes and meetings could, for example, help by bringing in 
a common language. NGOs also could take on a greater responsibility for raising 
awareness on environmental risks in the Baltic Sea area so as to create a common 
agenda. 
 4.  The precise  form of communication and use of mediums for communication 
needs to refl ect the transnational nature of risks under consideration, their con-
text and whether they arouse, or could arouse, societal concern. It is important to 
note that some risks are related to more or less global fl ows (e.g. chemicals) that 
even more so accentuate the challenges. Since there is a need to raise the degree 
of political and public awareness about the fi ve risks in the Baltic Sea region, 
national  news media has to highlight cross-country issues. There is a need for 
common media and shared platforms for debating issues, including regional 
media stations in different regions (e.g. the Baltic Sea or Mediterranean area). 
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So far there is no infl uential transnational (e.g. European) media. Nor is there an 
international  public sphere with a role in governance and political communica-
tion. Hence, on the one hand, we have a situation in BSR where an arena for 
environmental risk governance exists, including regional actors and networks 
like HELCOM and UBC (and also a request from the  European Commission’s 
White Paper on European Governance that a regional or international public 
should be involved and invited to participate in decision-making procedures). 
On the other hand, there are obvious obstacles for public  deliberation and  par-
ticipation on risk issues in Europe and in different regions in Europe. Important 
parts of the public sphere are missing and there are no common agendas or are-
nas for public participation. Such a situation prevents positive development of 
future governance efforts. 
 5.  Risk governance and communication could also make much more  use of  digital 
media platforms. Online media offer spaces and platforms where  citizens may 
engage in dialogic communication. So far, ICTs (Internet, social media and the 
like) are an important source of  information for NGOs and other stakeholders 
who already possess some adequate knowledge about these platforms, but not 
for the public, who often do not know what to look for and where. Finally, it is 
important to stress the importance of both multiple and common agendas. 
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